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Mending Our Nets:                                            
Psychosocial Care in Post-Katrina New Orleans 
Jane Parker1 
 
During the writing of this article, my community and I experienced 
Tropical Storm Faye, Hurricane Gustav, and Hurricane Ike to varying 
degrees.  In the instance of Hurricane Gustav, I complied with a mandatory 
evacuation that was instituted for New Orleans and surrounding parishes.  
Though constant threats and disruptions to our safety occurred, the storms 
and the evacuation allowed some of my colleagues and me to compare the 
state of psychosocial services and other disaster-related issues from post-
Katrina to post-Gustav.  In general, the evacuation of vulnerable groups 
had dramatically improved across the region.  Nevertheless, the issues of 
race, class, and economic valence were again obvious in terms of who had 
the resources for transportation out of harm’s way.   
For people without a car or money to pay for transportation and 
temporary lodging, the decision to evacuate is more complex than for those 
in the middle- and upper- class with these resources.  For example, a 
minimum-wage earner who does not have family or friends with whom to 
stay or who lacks the money to purchase accomodations must stay in a 
shelter.  Food and gasoline costs add another burden to low-income 
households.  
I am fortunate to have family members less than three hours away; 
however, I would be able to purchase motel accommodations had I not had 
family within driving distance.  Therefore, my decision to comply with the 
evacuation order was fairly straightforward.   
The evacuation for Gustav evoked both current and Katrina-related 
anxieties and imposed certain expenses on my colleagues, friends, and me.  
Sitting in contraflow traffic,2 being displaced from home, and not knowing 
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the actual status of one’s property and belongings add to the worry and 
exhaustion of even the “ideal” evacuation.  We experienced what I have 
termed “evacuation fatigue.” Frankly, I doubt that I would have evacuated 
a second time in one hurricane season, even though I know better. 
 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and the Gulf Coast with a vengeance 
on August 29, 2005, leaving thirteen hundred known dead and millions of 
dollars in property loss and damage in its wake.3  It has become known as 
the worst natural disaster in recent U.S. history.  While the city and 
surrounding regions were battered by natural disaster, a technological 
disaster—the failure of an inadequate man-made levee system—flooded 
almost 80 percent of the city.  The levees protecting the city could not 
withstand the powerful surge from Katrina, leaving many homes severely 
flooded and their owners unable to return home.  Those who did not 
evacuate were at risk of drowning in their own homes; sadly, many did.  
The media were full of pictures of people wading in above-the-waist water, 
retreating to their roofs, and being forced to leave pets behind as Coast 
Guard helicopters airlifted them to safety.  
It is not only the physical environment of the city that was affected, but 
also the psychological environment.  The challenges of having quality 
mental health services available for existing and emerging mental health 
needs are being addressed, and, in some ways, services have improved.  
However, advocacy and program development are still needed due to 
remaining infrastructural inadequacies and concerns.  The need for 
innovative mental health program development is crucial, especially for 
populations who may have fallen through the cracks, such as immigrants, 
new residents, the elderly, adolescents, and substance abusers. 
This article discusses mental healthcare providers’ efforts to serve 
communities recovering from Katrina and the continuing need for mental 
health care, especially in light of recent evacuations associated with 
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav in fall 2009.  First, this article provides an 
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overview of a recovering city along five indices of community health: 
population recovery and shifts, economics, housing, public services, and 
mental health services.  Next, this article asserts that even adequate crisis 
response systems will continue to struggle in a city still in need of 
economic, housing, educational, and criminal justice support.  Additionally, 
ground-breaking programs and collaborations within a struggling 
community are discussed to inform and inspire the reader to follow the 
recovery efforts in the New Orleans and Gulf Coast region, with particular 
attention to psychosocial needs and vulnerable populations.  Finally, with 
Tropical Storm Faye and Hurricanes Ike and Gustav pounding the city 
during the writing of this article, reflections on infrastructural 
improvements and  continued needs of residents are offered. 
I. A RECOVERING CITY  
In discussing the psychosocial or mental health service system of post-
Katrina New Orleans and the new demands on that system, it is first 
necessary to understand the broader environment of the city and its post-
Katrina recovery efforts.  The recovery of the city is described through the 
pattern of population return, the housing issues returning residents face, and 
the shifts in daily business services offered to the public.  When discussing 
each of these areas, the shifts in the financial needs and economics of the 
region are also discussed. 
A. Population Recovery and Shifts 
To understand how the city is recovering and how the psychosocial 
systems are responding, one first needs to look to how the city is being 
reinhabited and the current needs of returning residents and newcomers.  
Three years after Katrina and the levee failures, 72 percent of the city’s 
residents have returned.4  In the greater region, 87 percent of the population 
has returned, 86 percent of jobs have been regained or newly gained,5 and 
sales tax revenues are at almost 90 percent of pre-Katrina figures.6  
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Nevertheless, the rate of returning residents, jobs, students, and home 
rebuilding has, as expected, slowed during 2008.7  Though the statistics on 
population demonstrate a city trying to rebuild and repopulate, the returning 
numbers significantly indicate that most residents have been through the 
evacuation process before and have memories of a pre-Katrina New 
Orleans. 
Both returning and new residents are relocating to the least flooded parts 
of the city and region, with 50 percent of active households in the drier 
neighborhoods.8  An increasing number of Hispanic households are located 
in the metropolitan area, with many residents working in construction or 
other aspects of physical recovery.9  By actively participating in physical 
recovery, this working population sees the continued and lasting devastation 
in the city.   
On the other hand, some groups of former residents seem to be choosing 
not to return in large numbers.  School enrollment data indicates that 
families with children are less likely to return to the area.10  Of pre-Katrina 
public and private school students, 76 percent have returned,11 and 
enrollment in the city is less than 50 percent.12  This data would indicate 
that while a majority of the New Orleans’s population is approaching pre-
Katrina figures, some of that population is comprised of new residents who 
came to the city largely for work opportunities in the construction and 
rebuilding industry.   
B. Housing 
Challenges of higher costs, especially for housing, greet newcomers and 
returning residents alike.  Along with the devastation to the region, the 
returning population is affected by the recent financial crisis in this country, 
making it more challenging for people to pay for the basics of food, 
gasoline, and housing both in and beyond disaster-affected areas.  With the 
landscape of supply and demand now skewed in New Orleans, fair-market 
rental costs in the region have risen by a staggering 46 percent.13  Many 
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low-income  and lower-middle-class residents, including essential service 
workers, cannot afford rent in the New Orleans area.  For example, child 
care workers and maintenance/repair workers have to spend on average 
more than 30 percent of their income on rent.14  A two-bedroom apartment 
now rents for an average of $990, as opposed to $676 in 2005.15  To further 
burden working-class residents, disaster housing assistance vouchers will 
expire in March 2009, affecting fourteen thousand low-income families.16 
 
Figure 1: Fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment has increased 
46 percent since 2005. 
 
 
S O U R C E: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair Market Rent 
History 2000 to 2005 and County Level Data File for 2006-2008. 
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Figure 2: Affordable montly rent by occupation with 2007 fair market 
rents.   
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S O U R C E: Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, 
May 2007, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, County Level Data 
File for 2006-2007. 
 
The above data demonstrates the difficulties that people in lower-middle- 
and low-income brackets face in affording housing.  The result is that more 
families are living in cramped and unhealthy conditions, often in crime-
ridden neighborhoods.   
Though residents have continued to return and rebuild New Orleans, risks 
remain high for certain vulnerable populations, such as immigrants and the 
homeless.  With an increase of Hispanic residents in the area, there are new 
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concerns about the affordability of housing and potential discriminatory 
targeting of this vulnerable group.  There are anecdotal, yet widespread, 
reports of Hispanic construction workers being mugged, robbed, or extorted 
for their wages.  The perpetrators seem to be taking advantage of these 
workers’ reluctance to access protective law enforcement services due to 
fears of being deported.17  
Regarding the homeless population, a 2008 article retrieved from The 
Real Truth claims that one in twenty-five residents in New Orleans is 
homeless.18  According to the advocacy group Unity for the Homeless, the 
rise is due to a number of factors:19 lack of affordable housing, cracks in the 
federal system designed to provide temporary housing after Katrina, 
insufficient financial resources,20 and closing of Charity Hospital and other 
service centers for the seriously mentally ill and addicts.21 
Additionally, the slow process of federal assistance is contributing to the 
risk of homelessness.  Funds from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) for the Orleans and St. Bernard parishes have not always 
reached those families in need of disaster aid.22  While the Army Corps of 
Engineers works diligently to improve the city’s flood protection to 
withstand the “1 percent storm” (a storm with a 1 percent chance of 
occurring per year), the Corps still identifies some neighborhoods that 
remain at risk of six to eight feet of flooding in another major storm.23  The 
federal agencies’ contributions to homelessness, resulting from a lack of 
secure housing and outright mistrust by many residents, add to the sense of 
anxiety and powerlessness among both the housed and the homeless. 
C. Public Services 
Along with shifts in population and housing, new needs are arising in the 
public services sector that need to be addressed, including education, public 
transportation, and child care.  In both the city and metro areas, Hispanic 
students account for 5.9 percent of enrollments, compared to 3.9 percent 
prior to Katrina.24  More students with limited English proficiency are now 
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enrolled in public schools.25  Therefore, there is an increased need for both 
English language training for Hispanic students and Spanish language 
training for teachers and service providers is increasing.   
Just as the city is struggling with issues of access to education because of 
the language demands of the new population, it is also struggling with its 
public transportation system.  Not only has returning to New Orleans been 
difficult for many, but once they have returned, low-income residents lack 
mobility around the city due to the city’s damaged public transportation 
system.  There is a continuing rise in the need for and use of public 
transportation; however, the Regional Transit Authority is not yet operating 
at even 30 percent of its pre-Katrina capacity.26  Prior to Katrina, public 
transit was underutilized in more affluent neighborhoods.27  With a new 
population mix, as well as a drastic rise in gasoline prices, the current 
demand is different.  The streetcar system has been restored during the past 
year, and I have observed that streetcars regularly tend to be full, especially 
during times when most people are traveling to and from work or school. 
Similarly, the availability of child care services remain far below pre-
Katrina levels, at 43 percent in Orleans Parish.28  Since many families with 
children have not returned to New Orleans, the exact demand for child care 
is uncertain; yet a National Public Radio report indicates there are only one 
hundred institutionalized day care centers in a region that had 
approximately three hundred prior to the storm.29  Finding staff for the child 
care centers is particularly challenging for those centers that want to 
reopen.30  While wages for child care aides are in the same range as those 
for food service workers, workers in the food service industry can often 
earn better benefits with bigger hotels or food chains such as Burger King 
or Starbucks.31 
The strain of seeking proper child care while trying to work or seek 
employment adds to parents’ stress levels.  Low-income women of color, 
who are the most disadvantaged minority in greater New Orleans and most 
large urban areas in the United States, are most affected by this struggle.32  
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These women are less likely to pursue mental health services for several 
reasons: lack of transportation, lack of child care providers, and fear of 
placing their children with unreliable caregivers.33 
D. The Need for Mental Health Services 
As a result of the psychological and social threats of the storm and 
flooding, returning residents, along with new immigrants coming to the city, 
need psychosocial care services at a higher rate than residents of the average 
American community.  For returning residents, this need stems from the 
experience of evacuating, living in temporary housing, returning, and 
struggling to meet basic needs.   
The population shift out of the more damaged neighborhoods, coupled 
with the slow delivery of assistance for homeowners to repair their 
property, contribute to the area’s almost seventy-two thousand vacant or 
blighted homes.34  These damaged, decaying properties and vacant, 
overgrown lots are a continual reminder of the devastation of three years 
ago.  Such visual cues act as a physical, daily reminder of the devastation 
and loss suffered by many, and they contribute to the psychological trauma 
for many residents.35   
Additionally, long displacements from home and the ongoing stressors of 
dealing with insurance, assistance agencies, contractors, and other entities 
have created a general sense of continuing disaster, with no recovery period 
for some residents.36  Many residents report experiencing Katrina brain, a 
term indicating general malaise, mood swings, poor concentration, bad 
memory, and a low level of persistent sadness and anxiety.37  
As a result, doctors, psychiatrists, and emergency room personnel report 
increased symptoms of hypertension, worsening of chronic illnesses, and a 
sharp rise in anxiety and depression.38  Popular media and scientific reports 
since 2005 have identified the rise in anxiety in New Orleans, with the most 
recent year seeing a shift from anxiety to much harder-to-treat symptoms of 
major depression.39   
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The mental health system must not only deal with the long-term effects 
of Katrina, it must also address immediate mental health needs of the 
rescued and the rescuer.  In the initial post-Katrina months, suicides tripled, 
according to the Orleans Parish coroner.40  Twenty percent of police 
officers and firefighters—many of whom had lost their own homes—
reported symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).41  Surveys of 
people living in FEMA trailers showed that 66 percent of female caregivers 
reported symptoms of anxiety, depression, and other mental disorders;42 
half of the children in their care reportedly had mental health problems of 
their own.43 
Such data sounds the alarm for greater integration of mental health 
considerations into all major emergency preparedness planning and 
response systems.  To think that responders and ordinary citizens will 
experience the personal or collective destruction of a disaster the magnitude 
of Katrina without psychological fallout is at once naïve and dangerous.  In 
New Orleans and nationally, those in the legal, social service, health care, 
education, and emergency planning professions have a particular obligation 
to advocate for psychosocial services for responders and residents.  
After Katrina, the need for mental health services for both the chronically 
mentally ill and the general population increased at a time when many 
mental health providers were unable to operate.44  A 2006 Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) report stated that half of those polled claimed to be 
suffering from mental health problems, yet only 2 percent of them were 
receiving services.45  Simultaneously, many healthcare providers were 
unable to practice due to flooding of their offices.  Because of evacuation or 
destruction of provider facilities, patients of both private and public mental 
health services were disconnected from their healthcare providers, thus 
disrupting their medication and/or psychotherapy regimens.  The massive 
flooding and eventual closure of the Medical Center of Louisiana—known 
as “Big Charity” hospital—left thousands of physically and mentally ill 
indigent persons without a medical facility.46  Prior to Katrina, the Big 
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Charity hospital was a Level 1 Trauma Center and the chief provider of 
indigent care in the city.47 
In addition to having lost facilities and services, evacuees returned to a 
very different life in New Orleans.  What many reports do not discuss is the 
difficulty of living in New Orleans with higher prices, higher insurance 
rates, and higher crime.  These subtle and not-so-subtle pressures, along 
with the threat of future hurricanes, add ever-present tension to the air of 
routine life in the city.  Ironically, at this writing, Hurricane Gustav’s outer 
bands and the surge of the Gulf have affected areas southwest of the city 
near the community of Lafitte, Louisiana, flooding homes and businesses 
again.  As before, local and state agencies, along with the American Red 
Cross and other social service agencies, responded to the crisis.  Though the 
response is immediate, I and many local residents ask, how many more 
times can we go through this?  The wearing effect of living under a 
hurricane threat for six months out of the year becomes more obvious in the 
days prior to an actual landfall, as the potential path of the hurricane shifts. 
II. AN IMPROVING MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 
Until 2008, the rate of returning or new psychosocial care services in the 
New Orleans’s area lagged behind the rate of repopulation.  Since then, 
innovative programming and collaborative planning have allowed increased 
improvements and access to mental health services.  Many individual 
practitioners and agencies are concerned about the state of psychosocial 
care in New Orleans, and solutions will require coordination among 
providers.  The Louisiana Public Health Institute has been a major leader in 
bringing together regional mental health providers and other stakeholders 
into a group called the Behavioral Health Action Network.  Through live 
and online collaboration, the Network identified the city’s critical mental 
health service needs, including psychiatric crisis response systems, 
including inpatient psychiatric treatment; provider workforce development, 
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recruitment and retention; and access to community-based psychiatric 
treatment and support services.48 
As a result of collaborative efforts, the landscape of mental health 
services has brightened during 2008.  New alternatives have been created to 
replace Big Charity Hospital, which prior to Katrina provided 96 percent of 
emergency psychiatric stabilization sources.  Most recently, the situation 
has been improved by the addition of the following five programs: 
1. Mental Health Emergency Room Extensions (M-HERE) in 
University Hospital and West Jefferson Medical Center; 
2. Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams under contract with 
Metropolitan Human Services District (MHSD); 
3. Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority (JPHSA); 
4.  Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training for New Orleans police and  
Jefferson Parish sheriff deputies; and 
5.  Additional psychiatric beds in LSU’s Calhoun Campus and New  
Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH). 
 Additionally, Louisiana’s governor, Bobby Jindal, and the state 
legislature have taken steps to improve services and New Orleans’s access 
to them.  Of particular significance was creation of the Primary Care Access 
and Stabilization Grant (PCASG) funding, which provides mental health 
services on a sliding fee scale.49  Further, other federal and FEMA disaster 
relief money has finally reached service providers in recent months, 
allowing for the development of long-awaited programs.  In total, the 
Department of Health and Human Services has spent almost 2.7 billion 
dollars for health care recovery for the entire Gulf Coast region.50  While 
these program and funding additions are certainly progressive, there is still 
a need for more economic, housing, and other basic infrastructural support.   
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FIELD 
The restructuring and collaboration in mental health service provision has 
started a dialogue in the community about what is still needed.  The 
recruitment of new service providers is an area of concern currently being 
addressed.  New providers can offer economic and psychological support 
not only to the community, but also to existing providers who suffer from 
overwork and fatigue from the past three years. 
A. Response to Needs of Service Providers   
An ongoing concern is the mental health of the mental health workforce, 
specifically regarding recruitment, retention, and the health of the providers 
themselves.51  The Louisiana Public Health Institute’s 2008 mental health 
status update underscores this concern: mental health staff directly impacted 
by the hurricanes may still be attempting to rebuild their personal lives, 
individuals providing care experience similar symptoms as their clients, 
such as anxiety and PTSD, and civil service and nonprofit pay scales have 
yet to be adjusted to the new cost of living in the region.52    
 In an attempt to inform workforce leaders of worker needs, LPHI is 
currently conducting a workforce survey to identify environmental factors 
impacting staff in health care settings.  Results are expected to be available 
in early October 2008.53  Furthermore, LPHI is administering a Louisiana 
Workforce Commission grant for health workforce development in priority 
parishes, including funding for mental health professionals.54  
Greater attention to individuals on the front lines of immediate disaster 
response and of ongoing recovery is vital for the continued health and job 
effectiveness of individuals and organizations.  Few humans will ever 
endure the experience of dealing with the sights, sounds, and smells of a 
flooded city where debris and bodies of animals and people were 
discovered.  Service people assist victims with their personal and collective 
traumas on a daily basis.  To persistently hear the horror stories of others, 
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while often not being able to offer full services, brings a secondary trauma 
to providers.  Building resilience enhancement programs into the 
organizational policy and practice systems of responder agencies may not 
only mitigate past disaster effects, but also inoculate workers, to a certain 
degree, against extreme psychosocial damage from future disasters. 
B. Response to Needs of At-Risk Clients 
In the wake of a major disaster, it is not surprising that individuals with 
the most serious illnesses are more likely to have episodes of exacerbated 
symptoms.  In order to decrease the frequency of psychiatric emergencies 
and to improve management of their occurences, the Behavioral Health 
Action Network  has come up with three recommendations.55 
 First, the Network recommends better outpatient care that closely follows 
the most serious, chronically mentally ill to prevent them from becoming a 
danger to themselves or others and to hospitalize them most frequently.  
Second, the Network recommends decriminalization of the chronically 
mentally ill.  Jail is not the proper place for mentally ill or addicted persons 
who are acting out in public.  Their symptoms need treatment through 
various combinations of psychiatric medications and appropriate level of 
care, whether inpatient, outpatient, day hospitalization, group home, or 
other.  Third, the Network recommends integrating nonurgent primary and 
behavioral healthcare services.  Logically, low-income residents who cannot 
afford transportation to distant specialized mental healthcare facilities will 
access decentralized and community-based facilities more frequently.  
Treating both physical and psychosocial issues in one location seems not 
only more efficient, but more holistic and normalizing after such traumatic 
events as hurricanes, deaths, property loss, and ongoing weather threats.    
One example of holistically treating a person’s needs within the 
community is an initiative of the Tulane University School of Medicine.  
The Tulane Community Based Health Center’s program creates a “medical 
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home” for patients where their physical and behavioral health needs can be 
addressed.56   
Additionally, recent legislation providing school loan forgiveness and 
other incentives to practice in underserved or disaster-affected areas have 
increased the number of healthcare providers and medical students coming 
into the region.57  Funding such as the Primary Care Access Grant provides 
greater access to mental health services by allowing free and sliding-scale 
payments.58 
Funding from the American Red Cross, door-to-door counseling 
programs like Louisiana Spirit, and the hundreds of volunteers still coming 
to the city further buttress the historically inadequate mental health 
system.59  With no major weather event in three years—until Faye, Gustav, 
and Ike—many felt safe to come into the city.  The number of college and 
graduate students interested in disaster recovery and mental health is 
increasing, resulting in curriculum changes and special programs like the 
Disaster Mental Health Certificate program of the Tulane School of Social 
Work.60  Social work, public health, and medical students can take a new 
course, Psychosocial Aspects of Disaster.  Students are required to work in 
interdisciplinary teams with a simulated disaster involving multiple layers 
of psychosocial and environmental needs.  Students must address the 
exercise from the emergency planning phase through response and 
recovery, with particular attention paid to vulnerable populations.  Related 
to this curriculum change, existing courses such as Crisis Intervention and 
Comparative Treatments of Anxiety and Depression have added more 
psychosocial case studies in disaster and recovery.  
C. Response to Need for Basic Services 
Along with development of and support for psychosocial services for 
providers and at-risk clients, New orleans is improving basic services in 
preparation for future evacuations.  From his experiences with Katrina, 
Gustav, and other emergencies, Matt Kallmyer, deputy director of the 
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Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) for the City of New Orleans, 
offered the following information regarding transportation and sheltering 
after Hurricane Gustav:61  
1. While the City-Assisted Evacuation Plan was successful in moving 
thousands of residents out of the city via trains and buses, there were still 
many people who waited too long before requesting Hurricane Gustav 
evacuation assistance, even though evacuation was meant to be more 
accessible as residents could call 311 or register online or in person with 
their parish OEP for services.  
2. Government-subsidized assistance with personal fuel costs may 
promote greater willingness to evacuate, as would a moratorium on gas 
taxes during evacuation and repatriation.   
3. The OEP would like to see a region-wide FEMA sheltering plan.  A 
creative strategy would be to fund all hazard shelters with sleeping, feeding, 
showering, and toileting capacity beyond that of usual schools and sports 
arenas that could also be used as revenue-producing facilities for other 
venues in non-hazardous times.  
4. Although only in a proposal stage, one idea is to use closed military 
bases for future sheltering.   
 Transportation was a precious commodity during Gustav, despite prior 
vendor agreements.  One state bus vendor reportedly did not supply the 
promised buses, one of the three city vendors chose not to supply buses at 
all, and another supplied fewer buses than agreed upon.  The supply of 
ambulances and animal transport units was reportedly inadequate for 
moving seriously ill persons or for moving animals to safe shelters.  Though 
the city still is addressing logistical needs, the combination of an improved 
mental health care support system for both the population and service 
providers, along with infrastructural support around evacuation planning, 
will allow for a more holistic system of necessary services to the New 
Orleans population. 
HURRICANE KATRINA 
Mending Our Nets 53 
In conclusion, in addition to the recommendations of others captured 
earlier in the article, personal observations and study compel I want to 
reiterate certain points to address before, during, and after disasters 
regarding specific populations and programs. 
1. Services to Vulnerable Populations 
More psychosocial advocacy and program development are still needed, 
especially for immigrants and new resident workers who are often denied 
proper wages and basic safety on the job.62 Additionally, there needs to be 
constant awareness that the elderly, the chronically mentally ill, poor 
women of color, and the homeless are especially vulnerable in a disaster its 
associated evacuation.  Advocates for these groups must be part of the 
planning and policy formulation with the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness and the Department of Homeland Security.  Otherwise, 
services to these vulnerable groups would be reactive rather than proactive.  
From my interactions with local emergency planning and Homeland 
Security personnel, I know that these personnel are, in fact, concerned about 
mental health needs and vulnerable populations.  They have been frank, 
however, in telling me that their priority is moving people out of harm’s 
way. They do not have the training or full resources to meet mental health 
needs.  However, they seem open to ideas on how to best address their 
needs through inclusion of social work and other mental health experts in 
the planning and execution of disaster response.  It is noteworthy that the 
Office of Emergency Planning now accepts social work interns for their 
required one-year field placement. 
In terms of services to the chronically mentally ill, New Orleans still 
needs more inpatient psychiatric beds, especially for adolescents and 
substance abusers.  Thus, greater coordinated case management across 
service providers, including evacuation and repatriation planning with their 
most at risk clients, is recommended. 
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2. Safety Planning by Private Citizens 
All citizens now must take increased responsibility in making a personal 
or family safety plan to activate in a disaster.  A safety plan should include, 
at a minimum, basic ways to communicate with family members during a 
disaster.  Phone numbers, an out-of-state contact, basic survival supplies for 
three days, and a first aid kit should be included in a family’s organization 
for disaster.  If there are elderly, disabled, or other persons with special 
needs in the household, early requests for assistance should be made for 
evacuation.  Individuals and families need to decide early on whether to 
remain sheltered in place or to leave the region, realizing the consequences 
of defying a mandatory order to evacuate.  Such defiance means the 
individuals cannot rely on normal services such as fire, police, ambulance, 
water, electricity, or public transportation during or immediately after a 
critical incident.   
In the regions where multiple and sequential threats exist—as in the case 
of Faye, Gustav, and later, Ike—and where the possibility of mandatory 
evacuations continue, residents experience evacuation fatigue and may 
become less likely to evacuate when needed.  Therefore, not only safety 
planning, but also community practice evacuation drills may increase 
citizen confidence in knowing what to do in emergencies.   
One such simulation was held in early July 2008, in which a mock 
evacuation was held to test emergency response and transportation systems.  
At the Incident Command Center, I participated in making calls to a parish 
Office of Emergency Preparedness with various requests for assistance.  
The scripts for the calls were based on actual calls from previous disasters.  
Further, the evacuation transportation systems were tested using over two 
hundred actors representing evacuees with various special needs.  
Additionally, the actual evacuation for Hurricane Gustav was a real test of 
these systems and of the contraflow traffic plan out of the city. My personal 
experience of contraflow was challenging, exemplified by my nine-hour trip 
to a relative’s home in central Missippi—typically a three-hour trip.   
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3. Continued Support for Service Providers 
Finally, more attention and resources should be focused on psychosocial 
care for primary, secondary, and ongoing responders who provide services 
during times of crisis.  First responders are those essential protective 
personnel who are first on the scene, like emergency medical services, fire 
fighters, and police.  Secondary responders tend to be people such as 
clinicians, social workers, and physicians who are meeting the off-site 
needs of the disaster victims.  There is overlap between secondary 
responders and ongoing responders who continue to work on disaster relief, 
such as nongovernmental organizations like Habitat for Humanity, 
volunteers, social workers, counselors, and case managers.  As previously 
discussed, immediate exposure to disasters and ongoing efforts around 
disaster relief exert a mental toll on all levels of responders.  In order to 
better serve a population in recovery efforts, continued vigilance and 
psychosocial support is needed for service providers and responders alike. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Holistic community recovery in New Orleans will simultaneously bolster 
the recovery of the mental health system.  Previously discussed initiatives 
by Louisiana’s new governor, Bobby Jindal, and the Louisiana State 
Legislature will hopefully continue to support community recovery and to 
mend the nets of psychosocial care in New Orleans.63 New collaborations 
have allowed innovative means of providing support and services to the 
community.  However, there is still much to do for the community to 
completely recover and for the mental health system to provide all 
necessary services with proper support. 
While television images of “business is back” in the Superdome and 
French Quarter are certainly applauded, the nation seems to have turned a 
blind eye, not only to the devastation of Katrina and the ongoing threats to 
the Gulf Coast regions, but also to the drastic social injustices they 
broadcasted as well.  According to the Second Kaiser Post-Katrina Survey 
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focusing on Orleans Parish, many New Orleans residents see a lack of 
opportunity, are disappointed in the pace of recovery, and feel forgotten by 
the nation and its leaders.64  The nation should not be oblivious or 
insensitive to New Orleans, not only because of the danger of a house 
divided, but also because it cuts off the exchange of knowledge for best 
practices in disaster recovery that can be useful in any part of the United 
States. 
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